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Abstract
Previous experimental results are reviewed to address the extent to which
oligopolistic equilibria are good predictors of behavior observed in laboratory
experiments with human agents. Although the theory is unrealistically de-
manding with respect to the agents’ informational and rational endowments,
experimental results obtained in more realistic settings with subjects using trial-
and-error decision mechanisms tend to confirm predictions of simple symmetric
theoretical models. However, in the presence of more complex and/or asym-
metric environments, systematic deviations are observed between theoretical
predictions and experimental results. Certainly, more effort should be made by
all parties involved to build a bridge between theoretical predictions and the
behavior observed in the lab in order to assist both the theorist and the policy
maker; the former to enrich theoretical models including the behavioral factors
identified by experimentalists and the latter to gain insights on the strengths
and weaknesses of theory in predicting human behavior in the marketplace.
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I Introductory Methodological Thoughts
Since more than half a century ago, the use of the experimental method in eco-
nomics has been inspired by the endeavor to bring theory closer to reality. It may
seem risky to claim that oligopoly theory was the first among all theoretical eco-
nomic paradigms whose predictions were tested in the lab. However, this claim is
anything but false, if one goes back to the origins of experimental economics when
Chamberlin (1948) and Smith (1962, 1964) ran the first experiments designed to
study whether a market with few trading agents1 would reach the competitive equi-
librium. However, rather than reviewing all experiments assuming few agents on
the supply side, in this article I adopt a more narrow definition of the term, focusing
on experiments which have been directly inspired on the basic oligopoly models by
Cournot (1838), Bertrand (1883), Hotelling (1929), Stackelberg (1934), and some
of their most immediate extensions, omitting other experiments like the aforemen-
tioned seminal ones by Chamberlin and Smith which in fact were designed to test
the predictive power of the competitive equilibrium.
Most of the experiments which are designed to test the predictions of oligopoly
theory in the laboratory, implicitly or explicitly address the following question:
Q: Are oligopolistic equilibria —derived in abstract settings under the assump-
tion of fully rational, risk neutral, perfectly informed agents with infinite calculus
capacity— good predictors of behavior in oligopolistic environments with human
agents?
In most of the cases, this question is answered together with some of its natural
extensions, two of which are especially interesting for our review:
Q1: If the answer to Q is negative, which are the main reasons of deviation be-
tween theoretical predictions and behavior by experimental subjects acting in similar
settings in the lab?.
1According to the Greek etymology of the word, oligopoly is a market with few (o˙λ´ıγoι) sellers
(piωλητα´ı).
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or
Q2: If the answer to Q is negative, which are the implications of this finding
for the relation between the prediction of oligopoly theory and the functioning of
real-world markets?
The question formulated in Q2 is a moderate version of the most frequent criti-
cism received by economists who use the lab in order to reach policy and strategy-
relevant conclusions. Trying to aggregate all the anecdotal information and personal
experience from sceptical peers’ comments on this issue in one sentence, I summarize
below this critique:
C: Given that all experiments on oligopoly models have been run with inexperi-
enced subjects recruited among populations of young university students motivated
with small amounts of money, what can be learned from their observed actions which
could be applicable in real-world markets oligopolized by big companies managed by
high-level CEO’s and managers whose wealth and happiness critically depend on
their decisions’ implications for their firms’ performance?
Arguably this criticism is often expressed in less aggressive ways or is correctly
inspired by the impossibility or at least difficulty of implementing specific non-
monetary motivations of subjects in the lab. This is especially the case when over-
realistic designs are implemented in order to replicate a manager’s status, workers’
retirement plans, promotion possibilities, ethical issues, environmental externalities
and other non-neoclassical sources of motivation for oligopolists. I do not imply
that such over-realistic designs are wrong or hopeless, but an experimentalist should
think twice before trying to bring such factors in the lab.2 Also, we must admit that
some oligopoly experiments may be wrongly designed or wrongly focused. Except
for these cases, in all other cases the criticism in C is wrong and unfair.
Wrong: The fact that a critical reader finds it difficult or impossible to draw
2Such issues have been successfully addressed in other areas of experimental research within less
orthodox economic domains like economic psychology when studying, for example, phenomena like
cognitive dissonance and reciprocity.
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meaningful and policy relevant conclusions from a certain experiment is not by itself
a proof of the fact that the experiment is wrongly designed or irrelevant, because it
may be the result of the critique’s unwillingness to interpret the results or lack of
imagination.
Unfair: If this critique were decisively applicable to oligopoly experiments, it
should automatically invalidate also the underlying theoretical model which inspired
the design. In that case, the critique would hold a fortiori in the following form:
What can we learn on real-world markets and real firms’ strategies from abstract
models assuming that managers write down deterministic profit functions in order
to make their decisions by solving equations which result from equalizing first deriva-
tives to zero? The absurdity of this argument shows the unfairness of the critique in
C. This is so, because it is a well-known fact that, although managers follow differ-
ent decision rules from those assumed in oligopoly models, many of the theoretical
predictions of oligopoly theory are adopted world wide as the basis for market reg-
ulation and policy towards collusion, dumping, best price guarantees, advertising,
vertical restrictions, market segmentation and a plethora of phenomena of which an
exhaustive list is beyond the scope of the present paper. Therefore, if abstract mod-
els making the aforementioned unrealistic assumptions are so useful to the policy
maker, then testing the performance of these models in equally abstract environ-
ments inhabited by real human agents deciding and learning from trial-and-error
processes should imply some value added to our knowledge on the economics and
regulation of strategic interaction in markets with few sellers.
We do not disregard here the possibility or even the need of re-making the whole
paradigm of oligopoly theory by incorporating a number of non-standard behav-
ioral assumptions.3 Yet, doing so would not imply that traditional non-behavioral
oligopoly theory is wrong or useless, provided that some simple, clear cut predic-
3For example, almost nothing has been done by oligopoly theorists to accommodate Simon’s
(1991) approach to the links between individual and organizational decision making as a result of
the interaction among many economic agents.
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tions receive favorable evidence in markets with human -thus, imperfect, complex
and heterogeneous- agents. Producing this evidence is a primary task that should be
undertaken in the lab, which would be equivalent to testing whether simple abstract
models can be used to study more complex real-world markets. This brings us to the
main question addressed in this article: To what extent can simple oligopoly models
predict behavior observed under more realistic rules governing the informational and
rational endowments of agents?
Answering this question is crucial for both theorists and policy makers. The
former could be helped to write new, more complete models aimed at mitigating the
factors which are responsible for the deviations between observed behavior and the
corresponding theoretical predictions; the latter could be warned on the weaknesses
of theoretical predictions when used to organize behavior by less than perfectly
rational, fully strategic and mathematically competent agents.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents an
overview of experiments designed to test the predictive power of standard oligopoly
models and some of their immediate extensions. Section III concludes.
II The Resurrection of Oligopoly Experiments
We present here a series of experiments, most of which were run over the last decade.4
This strand in the literature can be considered as a new wave of experimental pa-
pers reporting results on experimental tests of the basic oligopolistic models. I am
referring here to this research line as the the resurrection of oligopoly experiments,
because it represents a more recent and systematic effort by experimentalists to
study an issue which is similar but not identical to that addressed in the seminal
papers by Chamberlin (1948) and Smith (1962, 1964) who also studied markets with
4Earlier experimental tests of Industrial Organization Theory are thoroughly reviewed by Plott
(1982). Later, Holt (1995) presented an overview of more recent experimental results from oligopolis-
tic markets.
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few sellers. While these two early contributions compared human behavior in the
laboratory with the competitive equilibrium prediction, the series of experiments re-
viewed here are designed to compare the observed behavior with the corresponding
oligopolistic equilibria.
The section is divided in self-contained subsections referring to different parts of
oligopoly theory including monopoly as well as a number of extensions of the basic
models, which are selected in order to have a representative but not exhaustive list
of insights that can be gained from oligopoly experiments.
II.1 Monopoly
The simplest issue which can be addressed in the spirit of the question formulated
in Q is whether the optimal price corresponding to a static monopoly with linear
demand and costs can be reached —and if so, how fast— by limit strategies of
unexperienced and uninformed monopolist-subjects who learn from trial-and-error
mechanisms. This could be the simplest experimental design which could be used
to test the aforementioned intuitive conjecture. To my knowledge, this experiment
has not been run so far, or if it has, the results have not been reported in any of the
usual outlets, probably due to the almost trivial findings. Full convergence is always
achieved, although the time of full convergence may vary depending mainly on the
grid of the strategy space available to the subjects. For example, a monopolist faced
with a demand function Q = 100 − 2p without knowing the exact form of it and
costs C = 0 should learn to set the optimal price p∗ = 25. Undergraduate students
offered a strategy space ranging between 0 and 500 with an unlimited number of
decimal digits will consciously tend to adopt exactly this price after 6− 10 trials of
experimenting with initially random prices which are later improved using feedback
from past periods as the only relevant information available.
However, things drastically change once some degree of complexity is introduced
to the monopolist’s problem by asking subjects to submit simultaneously prices
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for two products. In such a framework, Kelly (1995) reports significant deviations
of subjects’ strategies from the monopolistic optimum. Garc´ıa-Gallego, Georgantz´ıs
and Sabater-Grande (2004) design a two-product monopoly setting, assuming that a
monopolist’s products i and j are demand substitutes as denoted by the asymmetric
demand system, qi = ai−bpi+gpj and that production costs are constant and equal
to C. The predicted optimal monopoly price pair (p∗1, p∗2) is confirmed by subjects’
limit choices averaged per product, but convergence is slower than in the single
product case, especially if monopolists do not receive feedback containing additional
information enabling them to distinguish between the direct and indirect effects of
price changes on each product’s demand.
A complex dynamic water market is managed by the participants acting as mo-
nopolists in the basic treatment of the experiments reported by Garc´ıa-Gallego,
Georgantz´ıs, Kujal (2006a, 2006c) and Georgantz´ıs, Garc´ıa-Gallego, Fata´s, Kujal
and Neugebauer (2004). It is found that subjects systematically fail to learn and
converge towards the optimal level of stocks even after 50 periods of learning from
their feedback on past strategies. On the contrary, the existence of a sufficient level
of reasoning is confirmed in terms of the subjects’ understanding of the hydrologi-
cal properties and equilibrium of the aquifer system implemented. Thus, subjects
achieve a sustainable flow of water supplied to the market, although they seem to
be reluctant to let stocks fall too much due to an unfounded fear of scarcity and
high extraction costs in the future.
Summary: The strategies of monopoly subjects who decide based on trial-and-
error converge to the equilibrium prediction of the corresponding full information
static monopoly model, although the speed and precision of the convergence process
decrease when monopolists are faced with more complex problems, like for example,
multiproduct decision making. In that case, appropriately modifying the feedback
received from past strategies improves the convergence to the equilibrium prediction.
As the complexity of the set up increases and subjects are asked to deal with the
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dynamic aspects of their markets, systematic learning failures are observed. In such
cases, decisions based on learning from feedback in past periods are significantly
different from the corresponding monopoly optimal solutions.
II.2 Price-setting oligopoly
The earliest experiments reported on this issue go back to Fouraker and Siegel’s
(1963) seminal work. In fact, these authors pay special attention to the issue which
is central in the present review of oligopoly experiments, namely the role of more
realistic assumptions concerning the agents’ informational endowments on the likeli-
hood that oligopolistic equilibria are a good predictor of the behavior observed in an
experimental market. The authors confirmed that agents who are privately informed
on their own payoff structures will tend to converge to the full information Bertrand
Nash equilibrium, while having information on the competitor’s payoff structure
leads a subject to set higher prices than those predicted by the non-cooperative
equilibrium.
A second, much more recent wave of oligopoly experiments have adopted market
clearing mechanisms in which buyer behavior is based on a simulated continuous
demand function.5 In fact, given the well-known discontinuity of payoff functions of
price setting firms in homogeneous product markets, experimentalists have tested the
Bertrand equilibrium prediction in the laboratory assuming differentiated products.
For example, Garc´ıa-Gallego (1998) uses a symmetric demand system consisting of n
equations of the type qi = α−βpi+θ
∑
j 6=i pj , where pi is the price of variety i, n is the
number of varieties available in the market, whereas j represents each one of variety
5Accounting for systematic shortcomings observed with respect to the subjects’ ability to deal
with continuous strategy spaces, several authors have opted for presenting subjects with payoff
matrices corresponding to discrete games resulting from the combination of discrete strategy spaces
available to the players. We will not insist here on whether this practice artificially facilitates the
emergence of candidate equilibria in the laboratory, which would be an interesting issue to address
in an appropriately designed experiment. Generally speaking, it is a matter of the experimentalist’s
taste whether a better chance should be given to the theory by design or, alternatively, a more
realistic setting should be implemented.
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i’s substitutes. The parameter θ determines the degree of interdependence among
varieties. This type of demand system corresponds to the case in which each variety
can be imperfectly substituted to the same degree of substitutability by any of the
other varieties in the market. Unit cost c is constant and equal for all varieties and
no fixed costs exist. Despite systematic efforts by the subjects to tacitly coordinate
setting prices above the non cooperative level, the Bertrand Nash equilibrium is
found to be a strong attractor of individual strategies, especially towards the second
half of the session. The 35-period horizon adopted proves to be sufficiently long
for most subjects to converge surprisingly close to the Bertrand prediction, whereas
in some sessions, observed and predicted behavior coincide. See Figure 1 for the
evolution of prices in a typical session of this experiment. Abbink and Brandts
(2004, 2005) also study experimental price setting markets whose results yield less
clear cut conclusions on the predictive power of the Bertrand-Nash prediction, but
their design is not directly aimed at testing any specific prediction of oligopoly
theory.
Garc´ıa-Gallego and Georgantz´ıs (2001a) implement the same demand and cost
conditions as those adopted in Garc´ıa-Gallego (1998) to test the predictive power
of Bertrand Nash equilibrium in the presence of multiproduct firms. Apart from in-
creasing the complexity of a multiproduct firm’s problem as compared with a single
product one’s, the existence of firms managing more products in the market yields
asymmetric Bertrand equilibrium predictions despite the aforementioned symmet-
ric demand system. It is found that multiproduct firms fail to realize the strategic
benefits from their multiproduct market power emerging from the theoretical possi-
bility of absorbing the horizontal externality between the jointly managed products.
Thus, learning by trial-and-error in the basic treatment yields strategies which are
closer to the single product Bertrand Nash equilibrium and, thus, do not confirm
the corresponding multiproduct Bertrand Nash equilibrium prediction. This finding
has been re-interpreted in the experiments by Davis and Wilson (2005) in terms of
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its implications for merger policy. That is, if firms fail to realize their market power,
post merger equilibria may not look significantly less competitive than pre-merger
ones. However, in an alternative treatment of the experiments by Garc´ıa-Gallego
and Georgantz´ıs (2001a), the imposition of an exogenous rule involving price par-
allelism among jointly produced varieties is shown to lead subjects’ limit strategies
close to the corresponding Bertrand Nash equilibrium. Figures 2 and 3 present ex-
amples of sessions with multiproduct oligopolies. The former is a typical session in
which the adoption of price parallelism leads to the collusive equilibrium, whereas
the latter depicts the case of a session in which multiproduct subjects do not adopt
price parallelism and cannot escape from the single-product Bertrand-Nash equilib-
rium. The issue of price parallelism had been previously studied by Harstad, Martin
and Norman (1998) in a context which was specifically designed to address this issue.
It was found that the conscious adoption of price parallelism by competing sellers
has the expected effect of raising prices towards the collusive prediction.
Summary: Like in the case of a single-product monopoly, the symmetric Bertrand
Nash equilibrium prediction is confirmed by limit strategies obtained from oligopolis-
tic subjects who learn and decide using information acquired from the feedback re-
ceived through a trial-and-error process. However, in the presence of some complexity
and especially when the setup becomes asymmetric due to the existence of multiprod-
uct firms in the market, the predictive power of the corresponding Bertrand Nash
equilibrium is reduced and is not regained unless specific exogenous rules are im-
posed in order to help the learning process converge towards the ‘right’ attractor.
Generally speaking, price parallelism facilitates sellers’ coordination on prices which
lie above the non cooperative prediction.
II.3 Quantity-setting oligopoly
Unlike in the case of price-setting oligopolies in which the most appropriate ex-
perimental setup is that of imperfectly substitutable products, most experimental
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Cournot markets have been studied under the assumption of product homogeneity.
Thus, no direct comparison of the two setups has been attempted with the exception
of the experiments reported by Altavilla, Luini and Sbriglia (2006), in which both
quantity and price setting markets are studied in the framework of differentiated
products.6 Contrary to the moderately positive findings of this experiment concern-
ing the predictive power of the corresponding oligopolistic equilibria, there seem
to be fundamental differences in the degree to which Cournot and Bertrand equi-
librium predictions organize the experimental data obtained in the corresponding
experimental setups.
Rassenti, Reynolds, Smith, and Szidarovszky (2000) and Huck, Normann and
Oechssler (2000, 2001) study experimental Cournot markets. A rather general find-
ing in Cournot settings is that, while some learning occurs during the session, total
output persistently oscillates around the Cournot prediction. Such persistent oscil-
lations significantly decrease the predictive power of the corresponding equilibrium
prediction. Furthermore, in many sessions total output is not significantly different
from the collusive prediction, while in other sessions, total output oscillates between
the collusive and the Cournot outcome.
Overall, the dynamics of experimental quantity-setting markets present much
higher volatility than that observed in price-setting ones. Specifically, whereas
volatility decreases and tends to disappear even from individual price data towards
the end of a 35-period session, Cournot markets exhibit constantly volatile patterns
which do not change over time. However, as said before, a formal comparison cannot
be made here and all comments on the aforementioned differences are based exclu-
sively on the observation of the temporal patterns presented by time series plots of
the corresponding data. In fact, Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2000) implicitly
6Although, generally speaking, the experiment provides evidence supporting the Nash equilib-
rium prediction for both price and quantity setting markets, the role of information from past
strategies and performance is shown to be crucial. Thus, it cannot be seen as a direct test of the
two seminal oligopoly models. Therefore a more detailed comment is provided on this experiment
in a section dedicated to information and learning from others’ strategies.
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propose inequality in earnings as an explanation of why subjects’ strategies may fail
to converge towards the theoretical predictions of asymmetric oligopolistic equilib-
ria, although this explanation leaves unexplained the volatility of output observed
in most experimental Cournot markets.
Summary: The theoretical predictions of quantity-setting models perform worse
than their price-setting counterparts in organizing data obtained under the corre-
sponding experimental market conditions. Specifically, total output in experimental
Cournot markets is persistently volatile and often significantly differs from the corre-
sponding theoretical predictions. Similar to what was observed in asymmetric price-
setting experiments, asymmetric quantity-setting setups pose a further difficulty for
the corresponding theoretical prediction to successfully organize behavior observed in
the laboratory.
II.4 The Hotelling model of product differentiation
In the basic economic model of product differentiation, firms choose first locations
representing varieties on a continuous and closed product space and then compete
in prices. This is the well-known model by Hotelling (1929). Several aspects of
the model which have an important impact on human subjects’ behavior are not
addressed or are treated as trivial in the theoretical model and its numerous exten-
sions. For example, the assumption of full market coverage cannot be guaranteed
by the design of the experimental setup. Once incomplete coverage is allowed a
proper experimental test of the theoretical predictions of the model becomes diffi-
cult or impossible. To tackle this problem, the vast majority of authors have opted
for treating prices as given in order to study the first stage of the model alone.
The experiments reviewed in this section are divided under two different headings
depending on whether exogenous or endogenous prices were implemented in them.
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II.4.1 Location with exogenous prices
Like in the case of many other phenomena for which real world data leave little space
for empirically testing economic theories, product differentiation models have been
tested in the laboratory. Brown-Kruse and Schenk (2000), Collins and Sherstyuk
(2000), and Huck, Mu¨ller and Vriend (2002), study experimental spatial markets
with 2, 3 and 4 firms, respectively. All three articles report experiments with indi-
vidual subjects whose only decision variable is location. That is, like in earlier work
by Brown-Kruse, Cronshaw and Schenk (1993), prices were taken to be exogenously
given.
Minimal product differentiation predicted by theory as the non-cooperative equi-
librium for the framework used in Brown-Kruse, Cronshaw and Schenk (1993) and
Brown-Kruse and Schenk (2000), as well as ‘intermediate’ differentiation predicted
as the collusive outcome of the framework when communication among subjects is
allowed were given support by their experimental results.
II.4.2 Endogenous locations and prices
The assumption of exogenous prices present in the previous subsection leads to a
framework which fails to address the standard intuition that a firm may want to
differentiate its product from those sold by rival firms in order to relax price com-
petition. Recently, Barreda, Garc´ıa-Gallego, Georgantz´ıs, Andaluz and Gil (2006)
report results from experimental spatial markets with endogenous pricing. The
expected positive relationship between differentiation and price levels is largely con-
firmed. Regarding the location stage of the game, minimum differentiation receives
stronger support than any of the alternative hypotheses. Figure 4 presents aggregate
results from the location stage of the game. These results are robust to variations
of the experimental conditions regarding the sharing rule implemented (automated
versus human consumers) to resolve ties.
Finally, Camacho-Cuena, Garc´ıa-Gallego, Georgantz´ıs and Sabater-Grande (2005)
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report experimental results from spatial markets with endogenous prices, but their
setup significantly deviates from the standard location-then-pricing game in that
they consider an extended game in which consumer locations are endogenous too.
They find that subjects representing individual consumers fail to realize the bene-
fits from locating in the middle between sellers in order to induce more competitive
outcomes. Their learning is not only insufficient to teach them how to adopt this
collectively profitable behavior, but on the contrary opportunistic behavior by other
buyers locating where sellers are, increases the adoption of transportation cost min-
imizing locations and leads to less competitive outcomes than predicted.
In both location experiments reported here, coordination between sellers trying
to avoid central locations in order to increase differentiation is proposed as the cause
of significantly lower differentiation than predicted by the corresponding equilibrium
prediction.
Summary: The principle of minimum differentiation receives far more sup-
port than other theoretical predictions for the Hotelling model, even in settings in
which some differentiation is predicted in equilibrium. The only exception seems to
be found in location experiments allowing communication among rival firms. How-
ever, the interpretation of this finding as a result of collusion may underestimate
the role of coordination problems faced by rival subjects when trying to simultane-
ously choose more differentiated locations. Endogenous pricing settings confirm the
predicted positive relation between product differentiation and prices.
II.5 Extensions of basic oligopoly models
This is the most incomplete part of the present review. In this subsection should
appear all the research lines that are omitted because they do not immediately fall
within the central theme of this article. We focus on oligopoly experiments which,
rather than testing specific theoretical models, are inspired by real world phenom-
ena on which the theory has not provided yet a clear cut prediction, often because
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theorists have not agreed on the right theoretical framework within which the corre-
sponding questions should be answered. We are also interested in experiments which
have identified regularities in human behavior which were not initially intended by
the experimental design. However, we must admit that the issues reviewed here
represent a small part of all experiments which have adopted theory-free designs
or have discovered unpredicted regularities. Obviously, among a plethora of such
experiments, I have chosen the research lines with which I am most familiar, in an
effort to produce an indicative list of questions that have been addressed so far as an
example of what else can be achieved by oligopoly experiments apart from testing
the predictive power of oligopolistic equilibrium predictions.
II.5.1 Stackelberg competition and endogenous timing
Huck, Mu¨ller and Normann (2001) compare Cournot and Stackelberg quantity-
setting experimental markets. Their results confirm the volatility of output data
obtained from quantity-setting experiments. Furthermore, they report some evi-
dence confirming the prediction that Stackelberg markets are more efficient than
Cournot markets. However, the asymmetric nature of leader-follower interaction
seems to be an obstacle in the convergence of observed behavior towards the theo-
retical prediction of the Stackelberg model. Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002) report results
from price-setting markets designed to compare simultaneous and sequential deci-
sions. An interesting behavioral finding is the difference between genuine sequential
games and sequential strategies elicited through the strategy method.
The experiments reported by Huck, Mu¨ller and Normann (2002)7, Fonseca, Huck
and Normann (2005), Fonseca, Mu¨ller and Normann (2006) and Mu¨ller (2006) al-
low for endogenous timing of strategic decisions. Thus, Cournot or Stackelberg
temporal structures may endogenously emerge in the lab. Finally, Huck, Mu¨ller and
Knoblauch (2006) study an experimental spatial market with endogenous timing. In
7See also the analysis by Normann (2002).
15
all these settings the typically asymmetric results corresponding to leader-follower
structures receive less support than expected. In fact, symmetric outcomes are sup-
ported by the evidence, even when leader-follower structures are predicted by the
corresponding equilibria.
II.5.2 Vertical relations and delegation contracts
Oligopoly models of vertical relations have received less attention by experimental-
ists than models of horizontal relations. Durham (2000) confirms the existence of
the double marginalization phenomenon predicted by the theory, whereas Martin,
Normann and Snyder (2001) test and partially confirm the theoretical predictions
on vertical foreclosure. However, Hu¨ck, Mu¨ller and Normann (2004) is the only ex-
periment on the influential theory by Vickers (1985), Sklivas (1987) and Fershtman
and Judd (1987), concerning the strategic role of delegation in oligopoly through the
design of managerial incentives. In fact, among all the incentive schemes proposed
in the vast literature inspired by the aforementioned seminal papers, the experiment
exogenously imposes schemes which compensate managers by linear combinations
of profit and revenue-related performance of their firms. The remaining types of
contracts have not been studied in the laboratory so far. This lack of systematic
experimental research on strategic delegation in oligopoly contrasts with a plethora
of experiments on the role of bargaining and incentives on economic agents’ actions.
This is certainly an unexplored area in which experimental research could yield very
fruitful results and strategy-relevant insights.
II.5.3 Equilibrium price dispersion and price dynamics
So far, we have reviewed experiments which were aimed at testing oligopoly the-
ories whose equilibria involve a single price. Contrary to this prediction, but not
surprisingly, experimental price-setting markets produce dispersed price data. Little
has been written on this systematic divergence between theoretical predictions and
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observed behavior. A different strand in the experimental literature has focused on
the issue of price dispersion inspired by oligopoly models whose equilibria are ex-
pressed in terms of price distributions. There are basically two theoretical settings
that have inspired experiments aimed at studying price dispersion. The first setting
is Bretrand-Edgeworth competition and the second are models with informed and
uninformed consumers like Varian’s (1980) model of sales.
Firms competing according to the Edgeworth-Bertrand model, set prices under
the restriction imposed to them by their capacity constraints. Framed as a test of
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition models, the experimental price dynamics reported
by Brown-Kruse, Rassenti, Reynolds and Smith (1994) offer some evidence for the
theory of Edgeworth cycles. In fact, this is the first confirmation of this theory’s pre-
diction concerning time dependence and cycles observed with respect to the subjects’
pricing strategies.
A more recent wave of experimental studies focuses on price dispersion, im-
plementing setups which are inspired by Varian’s (1980) model and the model by
Burdett and Judd (1983) focusing on the role of price sampling by informed buyers.
Experiments reported by Morgan, Orzen, and Sefton (2006) and Garc´ıa-Gallego,
Georgantz´ıs, Pereira, and Pern´ıas (2004) confirm the basic comparative statics pre-
diction of the Varian (1980) model according to which prices are higher in the pres-
ence of more sellers in the market, despite the fact that observed price distributions
significantly differ from theoretical ones. This can be seen on Figure 5. However,
the results obtained in the latter experimental paper offer little, if any support for
the Burdett and Judd (1983) model and for an extension of it accounting for biased
sampling of prices by the Internet-based search engine. Finally, Orzen (2005) offers
some evidence for the conjecture by Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004) concerning
the collusive-pricing attractor which tends to reverse Varian’s (1980) comparative
statics prediction regarding the size of an industry. The rotation of price distribu-
tions reported in Garc´ıa-Gallego, Georgantz´ıs, Pereira, and Pern´ıas (2004) may also
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be due to these coexisting equilibria, although that paper only implicitly and briefly
refers to the issue of equilibrium multiplicity.
A small number of theoretical papers study the dynamic properties of price dis-
tributions in markets with consumer search. Hopkins and Seymour (2002) have
shown that a broad family of learning dynamics may be stable under a relatively
demanding condition on the proportion of uninformed consumers in the market
(sufficient ignorance). While several experimental studies have addressed the com-
parative statics of price dispersion in markets with buyer search, a smaller number
of papers by Cason and co-authors8 focus on the dynamics of price dispersion in
laboratory data. Especially, the Edgeworth cycles reported by Cason, Friedman
and Wagener (2005) can be seen as evidence for the instability of price dispersion
predicted by Hopkins and Seymour (2002). Also, the serial correlation of individual
strategies detected by Cason and Friedman (2003) can be interpreted as evidence
against the hypothesis of mixed strategy play. Finally, Garc´ıa-Gallego, Georgantz´ıs,
Pereira, and Pern´ıas (2005) focus on the dynamic implications of the coexisting
dispersed and monopoly pricing equilibria in markets with informed and uniformed
consumers. Contrary to the majority of previous experimental studies, the subjects
were faced with the same history of rival prices, given that each subject is faced
with a number of simulated rivals whose behavior is extracted from mixed strategy
equilibrium distributions. Two coexisting dynamic patterns are identified occurring
parallel to each other. The two patterns concern two alternative peaks of typically
bimodal price distributions. The first peak is labeled as the interior pricing mode
and is shown to exhibit a decreasing trend over time, whereas the second is referred
to as the monopoly pricing one and is found to attract an increasing number of
observations. Surprisingly, these dynamic patterns concern behavior by individual
subjects learning from trial-and-error strategies when faced with a stationary series
of rival prices extracted from equilibrium price distributions.
8Cason and Datta (2004), Cason and Friedman (2003), Cason, Friedman, and Wagener (2005).
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II.5.4 Price guarantees
One of the most controversial practices in oligopolistic markets is the adoption of
guarantees by oligopolists ensuring the consumers a reimbursement in case the lat-
ter encounter a lower price for the same product at a rival’s shop. In fact, price
matching guarantees promise that the rival’s lower price will be eventually matched
after the reimbursement is paid, whereas price beating guarantees promise reim-
bursements which exceed the price difference reported by the claimant. The theory
has provided several explanations for the adoption of such guarantees. They may
have an informative role for consumers to easier identify low-price sellers, they may
be used as incentives for consumers to report a deviation by a firm’s cartel partner
from the agreed cartel price or alternatively they may be a way of increasing the
consumer’s valuation of the firm as a whole. Obviously, the policy prescriptions for
guarantees inspired by each type of motive are different.
Starting from this lack of agreement, experimental markets with price guarantees
have been studied in a rather theory-free way, given that none of the experiments
reported here is explicitly designed as a test of a specific theoretical model. The ma-
jority of experiments on price guarantees focuses on price matching alone9, whereas
Fata´s, Georgantz´ıs, Ma´n˜ez and Sabater-Grande (2005) study price beating in isola-
tion of other types of guarantees. Price matching and price beating guarantees were
compared by Fata´s, Georgantz´ıs, Ma´n˜ez and Sabater-Grande (2006), who distin-
guish between aggressive and soft price beating, depending on the degree to which
the price difference is exceeded by the reimbursement. It is found that price match-
ing and soft price beating have a positive effect on final prices, whereas aggressive
price beating tends to put downward pressure on prices. Thus, whereas the effect
of soft price beating and price matching is similar to that of price parallelism, ag-
gressive price beating is, as one would have thought, pro-competitive. This result is
9See Datta and Offenberg (2005), Dugar (2005) and Fata´s and Ma´n˜ez (2006).
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graphically presented on Figure 6.
II.5.5 Other (ir)regularities
In this subsection I briefly refer to a series of other regularities observed in oligopoly
experiments which should definitely receive more attention in future research.
An issue which has been recurring in all oligopoly experiments without being
a central theme of the majority of them is learning.10 In fact, I will argue here
that the learning process determines, to a large extent, the outcome reached in
an oligopolistic market. In fact, Cyert and DeGroot (1973) had made a seminal
contribution in this direction, by relating learning in oligopolistic markets with the
duopolists’ ability to reach the collusive outcome.
Several studies have aimed at identifying possible systematic patterns in sub-
jects’ learning strategies. Adaptive learning has been addressed in many of them.11
Thus, it has been implicitly admitted that subjects do not try to learn more on the
market than is necessary for them to support their decision making. Furthermore,
human agents do not seem to learn from sophisticated or formal processes leading
to an understanding that allows them to calculate optimal or equilibrium strate-
gies. To my knowledge, Garc´ıa-Gallego (1998) and Garc´ıa-Gallego and Georgantz´ıs
(2001a) were the only experiments offering subjects the opportunity to learn from
more sophisticated ways of processing feedback on past strategies. A whole range
of tools were available to the subjects, like OLS estimates of the underlying de-
mand model based on past data and several options concerning the desired graphs
(quantity-price, profit-price, etc.) of past periods. The conclusion of both studies
is clear cut: no subject made any effort to systematically infer information on the
demand conditions in order to calculate the optimal strategy by the use of explicit
10A necessary large omission is made here, given that I focus on learning in oligopoly experiments
alone, without reviewing the extensive theoretical and experimental literature on the more general
issue of learning in games.
11See, for example, Nagel and Vriend (1999).
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optimization, despite the fact that subjects were students of relatively advanced
and even postgraduate courses in Economics. Yet, learning significantly affects the
observed behavior, as strategies in most oligopoly experiments seem to start from
almost random, dispersed strategies which evolve over time towards the zone of can-
didate benchmark solutions like are the collusive and the non-cooperative outcomes.
Thus, although subjects do not seem to use explicit learning tools like those offered
to them in the aforementioned studies, they adopt strategies which serve at the same
time for earning profits from current actions and improving future actions using the
feedback received on past performance.
Using the data from the two aforementioned studies, Garc´ıa-Gallego and Geor-
gantz´ıs (2001b) estimate linear adaptive learning models of the type: pit = Ai +
BiEj 6=it +Σk 6=iGikpkt, where pit is product i’s price in period t. Ai, Bi are product-
specific parameters. Ejt is the producer’s expectation of rival firms’ prices for the
same product. The last term refers to the degree of price parallelism followed by a
firm with respect to its other products (k 6= i). The expectation for rival firms’ prices
in a period is a weighted sum of a pre-established expectation and a term referring
to rival past prices as expressed in: Ejt = ωEjt−1 + (1− ω)Σpj 6=it−1. The estimates
obtained confirm that most subjects’ actions can be classified according to different
values of the adaptive parameter ω, as defined in this model. As mentioned in the
section on price-setting experiments, this has lead the participants of this experi-
ment to successfully converge close to the theoretical prediction for single product
price-setting oligopolies. In the case of multiproduct oligopolies, a further condition
is required for convergence close to the corresponding multiproduct oligopoly equi-
librium prediction. The condition concerns the significance of the parallelism terms
G. Although these results are specific to the design adopted in those papers, a gen-
eral conclusion can be reached: The model describing the learning strategy adopted
by the subjects of an experiment determines to a large extent the degree to which
the observed behavior is compatible with the corresponding theoretical prediction.
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A natural conjecture stemming from this observation is that the more complex
an oligopoly setting is, the more restrictive are the requirements concerning the
learning process adopted by subjects in order for their limit strategies to confirm
the corresponding equilibrium predictions. If we would like to make the term com-
plexity more specific, we could mention asymmetries and multiproduct activity as
two of the numerous sources of it. However, the existing results are far from exhaus-
tive and different sources of complexity should be studied both in isolation and in
combination with each other in order to gain new insights on the interplay between
the oligopolistic environment and the learning process as causes of the observed
behavior.
This brings us to an important determinant of whether non-cooperative or col-
lusive outcomes are observed in oligopoly experiments. There is no doubt that
information affects the observed behavior. For example, Mason and Phillips (1997)
confirm the importance of information in a duopoly with cost asymmetries. It must
be stressed however, that a difference should be made on whether the treatment
of information in oligopoly experiments concerns ex ante information given to the
subjects by instruction or ex post information available to the subjects as feedback
available from past actions. Contrary to what is often asked by theorists in confer-
ences, ex ante informational treatments have little if any effect on observed behav-
ior because, as reported in Garc´ıa-Gallego (1998), subjects do not use information
which is not readily interpretable in terms of their decision making process. And of
course, this is true for both ex ante and ex post information. Therefore, informing
the subjects on the exact demand and supply conditions, when these are not easy
to interpret in a linear way in terms of proportional reactions of feedback to their
strategies, has little if any effect on observed behavior. On the contrary, informing
subjects on their rivals’ strategies in past periods and even more importantly on
others’ performance has a significant effect.
Feedback from own past actions is a plausible but not a unique source of learning
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in oligopoly settings. A series of experiments have focused on other types of learn-
ing.12. However, several experiments have identified a number of learning processes
which significantly differ from what has been assumed to happen in the stylized
abstract settings adopted by theorists. For example, information on the strategies
adopted by other players is studied by Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2000) and is
found to play a significant role in the emergence of collusive outcomes. Furthermore,
imitation of successful rivals is supported by the experimental evidence reported by
Offerman and Sonnemans (1998), Offerman, Potters and Sonnemans (2002) and
Bosch-Dome´nech and Vriend (2003). Recently, Altavilla, Luini and Sbriglia (2006),
find that informing oligopolists on rival past prices leads quantities closer to the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium prediction, whereas information on industry-wide profit
averages yield higher levels of cooperation due to less profitable subjects’ efforts to
improve their performance.
Finally, pre-play communication is certainly more likely to induce collusive out-
comes as has been established in various experimental studies13 even in dynamic
and complex oligopolistic environments14.
Another important behavioral issue which systematically affects behavior in
oligopolistic settings is inequity aversion. Although the result reported by Huck,
Normann and Oechssler (2001) is the only one which explicitly relates inequality
of earnings with the lack of stability in Cournot settings, we have seen above that
asymmetric settings are more likely to yield significant divergence between the-
oretical predictions and observed behavior in different contexts (quantity-setting,
price-setting, leader-follower models, etc.). Thus, inequity aversion is an important
12Theorists have offered a number of different alternatives on how learning occurs in strategic
settings. Although a review of the theoretical papers on learning is beyond the scope of this
article, it is worth mentioning Hopkins (2002) and Hopkins and Seymour (2002) as two of the most
representative examples of theoretical approaches to strategic contexts similar to the ones studied
here.
13See for example the experiments in Brown-Kruse and Schenk (2000).
14See the dynamic duopolistic market implemented in Garc´ıa-Gallego, Georgantz´ıs and Kujal
(2006b) as a water management setting with tacit pre-play confirmation of strategies.
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determinant of the degree to which theoretical predictions can organize behavior in
experimental oligopolies.
The oligopolists’ aspiration levels are also an important factor when analyzing
the relation between experimental and theoretical results. Huck, Mu¨ller, Konrad
and Normann (2006) find that aspiration levels can be used to explain why the
merger paradox may or may not fail in the laboratory. Davis and Wilson (2005)
have tested the Antitrust Logit Model in the laboratory. Several shortcomings are
identified which may also be attributed to the fact that merging firms have been in
the market place before the merger and that their past affects their current strategies
in a way which deviates from the post merger equilibrium prediction. Combining
this conjecture with the fact that asymmetric settings make it difficult for subjects
to learn their way towards an equilibrium which accounts for their increased market
power,15 we conclude that antitrust and merger policy must be redesigned to account
for the reduced predictive power of certain oligopolistic equilibria in a broad range
of situations.
The role of risk aversion on behavior in strategic environments is established by
Sabater-Grande and Georgantz´ıs (2002), who report that more risk averse subjects
are less likely to cooperate in a prisoners’ dilemma. Strangely, despite the claim that
some unexpected results in oligopoly experiments may be due to subjects’ uncon-
trolled risk attitudes, there is only one precedent of oligopoly experiments designed
to jointly address risky decision making and price competition. More in line with the
result in Sabater-Grande and Georgantz´ıs (2002) than with the theoretical predic-
tion on pricing in search markets, Garc´ıa-Gallego, Georgantz´ıs, Pereira and Pern´ıas
(2004) find that risk averse subjects tend to price their products more competitively.
Therefore, despite the theoretical prediction that in search markets the safe strategy
is to set the monopoly price in order to guarantee the maximum safest profit, the
15Due, for example, to the finding by Garc´ıa-Gallego and Georgantz´ıs (2001a) for multiproduct
oligopolists managing differentiated products.
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link between competitiveness and risk aversion seems to be an empirically confirmed
fact.
These last findings concern factors which are traditionally related with individ-
ual decision making. The example of Huck, Mu¨ller, Konrad and Normann (2006)
on the merger paradox is central in replying to critiques on whether experimental
results should be used to guide policy making in real world markets. A usual critique
is that while experimental subjects may be risk averse, firms are risk neutral. This
means that, presumably, not all factors affecting the convergence of observed be-
havior towards the corresponding theoretical predictions are relevant for real-world
markets. However, this critique is used too often without considering, for example,
the fact that most strategic decisions are made by individuals who possess similar
characteristics with those reported above. The managerial literature is full of case
studies in which a manager’s excessively risky or intelligent decision is recognized.
Furthermore, expected utility maximization, the central economic hypothesis on in-
dividual risky decision making is not a psychological theory, but a theory on non
linear utility from monetary earnings. If we recognize that managers make the deci-
sion on behalf of firms, and considering the fact that managers may have aspiration
levels due to personal, psychological reasons or due to their managerial incentive
contracts, why is it still a plausible critique that experiments run with individual
subjects have little to teach us on real-world companies?
Summary: The learning process affects and is affected by the context in which
decisions are made. A broadly confirmed intuition is that subjects in oligopolistic
environments learn from trial-and-error processes. Such processes can be reasonably
organized by models of adaptive learning in which subjects adapt their expectations
of others’ strategies based on past information and then react to this expectations.
However, more complex environments, like for example multiproduct oligopolies yield
more complex learning rules and are more demanding on the conditions that have to
be satisfied by the learning process in order for observed behavior to converge close
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to equilibrium predictions. Other types of learning like imitation of successful others
have also received support by the experimental evidence, but their role in determin-
ing the speed and the limits of the convergence process is still an under-investigated
research area. Information on other’s past strategies has ambiguous effects with dif-
ferent results reported for Cournot and Bertrand markets, whereas information on
industry-wide performance increases oligopolists’ ability to reach and maintain col-
lusive outcomes. The role of other behavioral factors like risk and inequity aversion
or decision making intelligence on behavior in oligopoly settings is largely unknown.
III Conclusions and Methodological Remarks
Extremely simple, symmetric settings offer the perfect ground for a harmonic coexis-
tence between experimental and theoretical results. However, the presence of either
asymmetries or a minimum degree of complexity alone is sufficient for a significant
divergence between theoretical and experimental results. As either of these factors
or both increase, deviations become larger. Some other factors may mitigate or en-
hance these deviations. The list of such factors presented in this paper is incomplete.
However, even if such a complete list existed it would fall short of the list of factors
which remain unexplored or under-investigated. Some of the experiments reviewed
here have introduced a number of interesting and policy-relevant research questions
which remain largely unexplored by theorists and unknown by policy makers. For
example, which is the reason for the systematic failure of asymmetric quantity-
setting experimental markets to converge towards the equilibrium prediction in a
precise and smooth way? Why do differentiated price-setting oligopolies suffer less
from this volatility and lack of clear convergence towards the equilibrium prediction?
But most importantly, which are the implications of this finding for policy making
in real-world markets or even for empirical research?
Many other questions are equally or even more under-investigated than the afore-
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mentioned differences in the performance of the Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883)
predictions when contrasted with behavior by human agents in the lab. For exam-
ple, two-stage games like the Hotelling (1929) model of product differentiation or
oligopoly models of strategic R&D investments and a huge number of theoretical
facts have received attention in few (a single paper, in most cases), if any, papers.16
And this is a major shortcoming of the way economists have used the experimental
methodology so far. Experimentalists from other disciplines usually find it diffi-
cult to believe and rely on the results obtained from an experiment which was run
once, by a single research group in a single research institution. In that sense, ex-
perimental economists suffer the consequences of employing an extremely ‘young’
methodology. An economist will, with probability close to 1, receive a rejection by
most journals if the submitted manuscript reports results from a replication of an
existing experiment. The critique that a certain experiment was already run 10
years ago sounds like a reasonably good reason for not publishing a paper, which is
invalidated by its unique precedent. Rather than being surprised by the long time
it took for this experiment to be replicated, even the author usually agrees that this
critique is a good reason for never publishing a manuscript. Contrary to this neg-
ative attitude towards replication, Experimental Economics17 explicitly encourages
authors to submit papers replicating previous experimental results. This and the
increasing tendency of experimental economists to interact with researchers from
other disciplines will gradually make us understand the value of replication and,
sooner or later, this will hopefully affect oligopoly experiments.
Future research should focus more on the most important although yet under-
exploited ground for cooperation between oligopoly theory and experimental eco-
16Just to mention three examples of important but under-investigated issues involving interesting
behavioral aspects which have been studied in few occasions —often only once— in the laboratory,
predatory pricing was studied by Isaac and Smith (1985), contestability by Brown-Kruse (1991) and
limit pricing by Mu¨ller, Spiegel and Yehezkel (2006). Finally, dynamic oligopoly theory is probably
the most promising but under-investigated area of research for experimentalists.
17The official journal of the Economic Science Association.
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nomics, which is the link between individual decision making and strategic market
interaction. Risk and inequity aversion, imitation, aspiration levels, envy, learning
shortcomings and even gender or decision making intelligence cannot be considered
policy or strategy-irrelevant any more.
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IV Appendix: Figures
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Figure 1: Experimentally testing the Bertrand-Nash prediction in a differentiated
oligopoly with 5 varieties. ‘B’: Bertrand-Nash, ‘m’: Monopoly (collusive) pricing.
After the initial periods of price volatility, strategies clearly converge to the Bertrand-
Nash prediction.
Source: Garc´ıa-Gallego and Georgantz´ıs, (2001b).
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Figure 2: Convergence to the collusive outcome in a differentiated price-setting
oligopoly with 5 varieties and multiproduct firms. ‘B3’: Multiproduct Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium prediction for a firm jointly setting prices for 3 varieties. ‘B2’:
Multiproduct Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prediction for a firm jointly setting prices
for 2 varieties. ‘B’: Bertrand-Nash, ‘m’: Monopoly (collusive) pricing.
After the initial periods of price volatility, strategies clearly converge to the collusive
outcome in a session in which multiproduct subjects adopt price parallelism among
products managed by the same firm throughout the experiment and tacitly coordinate
on price parallelism with rival firms.
Source: Garc´ıa-Gallego and Georgantz´ıs, (2001b).
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Figure 3: Testing the predictive power of the Multiproduct Bertrand-Nash equilib-
rium in a differentiated oligopoly with 5 varieties. ‘B3’: Multiproduct Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium prediction for a firm jointly setting prices for 3 varieties. ‘B2’: Multi-
product Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prediction for a firm jointly setting prices for 2
varieties. ‘B’: Single-Product Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, ‘m’: Monopoly (collusive)
pricing.
After the initial periods of price volatility, strategies fail to confirm the corresponding
Multiproduct Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Subjects fail to realize their market power
and the Single-Product Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is supported by limit strategies.
Source: Garc´ıa-Gallego and Georgantz´ıs, (2001b).
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Figure 4: Experimentally testing the minimum differentiation principle.
Hotelling’s (1929) prediction of minimum differentiation is confirmed as the modal
choice in an experiment with endogenous prices.
Source: Barreda, Garc´ıa-Gallego and Georgantz´ıs, Andaluz and Gil (2006).
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Figure 5: Experimentally testing the predictions of Varian’s (1980) model of sales
with 3 (Treatment 1) and 6 (Treatment 4) firms.
Empirical distributions are significantly different from theoretical ones, but the pre-
dicted effect of industry size on prices is confirmed.
Source: Garc´ıa-Gallego, Georgantz´ıs, Pereira and Pern´ıas (2004).
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Figure 6: The effect of price guarantees in a symmetric differentiated duopoly. ‘BSL’:
Baseline treatment (no guarantees), ‘PMG’: Price matching guarantees, ‘PB2G’: Ag-
gressive price beating guarantees promising to reimburse double the price difference
reported by the claimant. ‘BNE’: Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, ‘CS’: Cooperative so-
lution.
Aggressive price beating guarantees yield prices which are lower than those observed
in duopolies without guarantees, whereas price matching guarantees have a clearly
anti-competitive effect. In all cases, partners treatments (fixed matching of subjects
forming a duopoly) yield higher prices than strangers (random matching of subjects
forming duopolies in each period).
Source: Fata´s, Georgantz´ıs, Ma´n˜ez and Sabater-Grande (2006).
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